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Table of Contents:

Prince, Stephen, Firestorm. American Film in the Age of Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009 and Cettl, Robert, Terrorism in American Cinema. An Analytical Filmography, 1960 - 2008, Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland & Company, Publishers, 2009. Reviewed by Janka Skrzypek

Andrew Silke, et al., (edited by Andrew Silke). The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism. Routledge: Oxon UK, 2011. pp. 202. £21.98. ISBN: 978-0-415-55840-2. Reviewed by Robert W. Hand, University of Aberdeen

Leonard Weinberg. Global Terrorism: A Beginner's Guide. Oxford, UK, Oneworld Publications, 2005. Paperback US $14.95, pp. 182. ISBN: 1-85168-358-5, Reviewed by Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, United Kingdom.

Paul Brooker. Modern Stateless Warfare. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, E-book $85.00, pp. vii + 256. ISBN: 9780230274761.Reviewed by Aleksandr Pikalov, University of St. Andrews

Research Articles

A Quantitative Assessment on 26/11 Mumbai Attack using Social Network Analysis

by Sarita Azad and Arvind Gupta

Abstract

This paper analyses, the terror attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, popularly known as 26/11 terror attacks, as per a mathematical technique known as Social Network Analysis (SNA). This analysis of the behaviour of the ten attackers and their telephonic communications with their handlers in Pakistan even as the attacks were in progress is based on the open source information. Using the SNA technique, we identify the key members, sub-groups, and the interaction among the various members of the group. The analysis gives useful insights into the modus operandi of the terrorists. We have found that a star-type structure of hierarchy prevailed during the attack which means terrorists were well connected through a central node.

Key words: social network analysis, terrorism, mathematical models, 26/11 Mumbai attack.

1. Introduction

Over the past few decades, terrorism has become a major threat to international security [1]. In recent years, there have been frequent terrorist attacks around the world. One of the most high profile terror attacks executed by the cadres of the terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) on November 26, 2008 in Mumbai, (India), was meticulously planned. It began on November 26th and ended on November 29th after an intense operation lasting over sixty hours. The attack was carried out by 10 militants armed with advanced weapons at five prime locations in Mumbai, India's financial capital. Nearly 260 persons, from ten countries, were killed in the attack. The modus operandi of this attack is explicitly described in various reports [2-4], and in the report shared by the Indian government [5] with the government of Pakistan. According to the analysis by Raman (2009) [6], the Mumbai terror attack had an anti-India, anti-Israel, anti-Jewish, anti-US and anti-NATO agenda.

A terrorist organisation can be represented as a network using a technique known as Social Network Analysis (SNA) which studies social relationships amongst nodes and ties. In case of a terrorist network, the members are considered as the nodes, and the ties describe the interactive

or collaborative relationships between the pairs of node. There was an increasing interest in the application of SNA for the study of terrorism shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center twin towers in New York [7, 8]. In the past few years the techniques of SNA have brought about a paradigm shift in counter terrorism planning and strategies [9,10]. The descriptive and visualisation potential of SNA helps to explain group activities, target selection and motives. Also, new analytical techniques and innovative means to conjoin available data in the network make it a powerful tool for research and ultimately to give inputs for policy makers.

Network analysis is an efficient tool for unravelling the complexities of systems that comprise many interacting elements. SNA helps to answer the following questions [11]:

- Who is central node in the network?

- What sub-groups exist in the network?

- What are the patterns of interaction between sub-groups?

- What is the overall structure of the network?

- How does information flow in the network?

The objective of this paper is to present a mathematical assessment of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack using SNA technique. The paper relies on the information provided by the government of India in their report [5]. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives the background of Mumbai terror attack. Section 3 describes the various social networks that are generally used for terrorism analysis. Also, a description of the parameters of social network analysis is provided. Section 4 discusses the terrorist networking during the Mumbai attack at different levels of occurrence and the information available at the time of incident. The structural organisation of the Mumbai terror attack and the details of planners and trainers behind the attack are given. We use graphical software UCINET to obtain a network for the attack. Section 5 is a summary of the conclusions

2. The Mumbai Terror Attack: A Brief History

The Mumbai terror attack was executed by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a terrorist group based in Pakistan. The LeT was founded in 1987 with the express aim of helping the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and liberating Kashmir from India. The attack was planned well in advance and a Pakistani American David Headley was employed to gather critical information about Mumbai - which was later confirmed by Headley's confession in the Chicago case. It has now been revealed that Headley had played a central role in preparing the operation. He visited India many times to scout out targets. Based on the connections we have found in the report [16], the

Headley confession is an authentic source of information as to how the plan was conceptualised by both serving and retired officials of Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) along with the leaders and commandoes of the LeT, Hafiz Saeed (LeT chief), Lakhvi, Sajid Majeedid and Waasi.

10 militants carried out the Mumbai terror attack. Each member of the team was given rigorous training. They entered Mumbai clandestinely using a stolen boat, travelling all the way from Karachi by sea. They were equipped with sophisticated weapons and navigation equipment like Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and satellite phones. After reaching the territorial waters of Mumbai, they divided themselves into five groups and captured the high profile five stars Taj Mahal Hotel, on the Gateway of India, the Oberoi Trident Hotel, Café Leopold, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and the Nariman (Chabad) house Jewish community centre. The various locations of the attack are shown in the Figure 2.

Figure 2: Locations of 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks (source, Wikipedia)

Ismail Khan was the leader of the group. During the period of the attack the terrorists were in constant touch with their handlers in Pakistan. The Indian intelligence agencies were able to intercept their conversations on mobile and satellite phones as the attacks were in progress. While the contents of the intercepts are not known, the government of India has revealed the details of who was talking to whom. The attackers killed nearly 260 persons including several foreigners. While the Indian security forces killed 9 out of the 10 attackers, one by the name of

Ajmal Amir Kasab was taken alive and is now awaiting death sentence in a Mumbai jail. His testimony and that of Pakistani American David Headley in the US have been extremely valuable in reconstructing the entire sequence of events and have revealed now just how well planned the attack was. It turns out that the mastermind of the attack, LeT commander Lakhvi, was in Pakistan. During the entire operation lasting over 60 hours, the attackers were in touch with their handlers in Pakistan. Lakhvi and others are being tried in Pakistani courts.

3. Background of the different kinds of networks

Terrorist network analysis is a difficult undertaking because of the clandestine nature of terrorist groups [12]. These are covert networks where secrecy is the prime concern during the operation. Such networks are structured in such a way as to ensure efficient communication between members without being detected. Explicit theoretical studies have been undertaken on the predictive structure of the covert networks [13-15]. These networks are reported to have different formations such as ring, star and path in which the degree of covertness and communication efficiency depend on the connections between the nodes (Fig. 1). The star graph (Fig. 1b) is known as centralised network where all the nodes are connected only through one central node. On the other hand, the path graph (Fig.1a) is a network with one to one connections. The network shown in Fig 1 (c) is a complete network where all-to-all communication exists. It has maximum density and hence 100 per cent connectivity. The theoretical studies reveal that the path type is optimum in the lower order while star type network is best for balancing efficiency and covertness.


Figure 1. Types of networks.

The network for the 9/11 attack was structured using social network analysis [8]. The network was drawn based on information gathered about the 19 hijackers and yields a number of interesting properties. Using measures of centrality, Krebs elucidated the dynamics of the network. The 9/11 network has a path-like structure (Fig. 1a), which is an open and most decentralised network. Interestingly, this is an Al-Qaeda modus operandi, which was confirmed from a Bin Laden video.

3.1 Quantitative Parameters of Social Network Analysis

3.1.1 An adjacency matrix

The adjacency matrix $\{a_{ij}\}$ in social network analysis is a square matrix with as many rows and columns as there are nodes in the data set. The "elements" or scores in the cells of the matrix record information about the ties between each pair of nodes. If a "tie" is present, i.e. if one node can talk to the other, '1' is entered in a cell; if there is no tie, a zero is entered. The matrix contains the information about the existence or non-existence of a link. Therefore, the adjacency matrix can be defined as a set of numbers,

$$
Aij = \begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|}
 & a1 & a2 & a3 & a4 \\
\hline
a1 & & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
\hline
a2 & 1 & & 1 & 0 \\
\hline
a3 & 1 & 1 & & 1 \\
\hline
a4 & 0 & 0 & 1 & \\
\hline
\end{array}
$$

where we assume that there are four nodes in the network and the ties between them are binary numbers. Note that there are no diagonal entries in the matrix as the tie of a node from itself is not considerable.

3.1. 2 Centrality

Centrality deals with the role of individuals in a network. Several measures of centrality such as 'degree', 'betweenness', 'closeness', and 'eigenvector' can suggest the importance of a node in a network. The degree of a particular node is its number of links; its betweenness is the number of 'geodesics' (shortest paths between any two nodes) passing through it; and its 'closeness' is the sum of all the geodesics between the particular node and every other node in the network. An individual with a high 'degree', for instance, may imply that he is a leader; whereas an individual

with a high 'betweenness' may be a gatekeeper in the network. An eigenvector centrality is the measure of how much a participant interacts with the other "connected" or highly interactive members of the group. This can be useful in providing a snapshot of how group members interact, as the eigenvector scores of different members or subgroups may indicate the degree to which they have formed strong relationships with other influential or active members in the group.

4.1 Analysing the Mumbai Attack using Social Network Analysis

It is now known, from various reports available, that 10 ten terrorists were present at the time of incident, whereas three others were simultaneously handling the operation from Pakistan. The names and the locations of these attackers and the handlers are listed in Table 1 and 2.

Table 1: LeT handlers who operated from Pakistan (P).

S. No.	Handler's Names	Place of Operation
1	Abu Kaahfa	Pakistan
2	Wassi	Pakistan
3	Zarar	Pakistan

Table 2: Attackers who operated in Mumbai.

S. No.	Attacker's Names	Place of Operation	Abbreviations
1	Hafiz Arshad	Leopold Café and Bar	LC
2	Javed	Taj Mahal Hotel	TMH
3	Abu Shoaib	Taj Mahal Hotel	TMH
4	Abu Umer	Leopold Café and Bar	LC
5	Abdul Rehman	The Oberoi-Trident Hotel	OTH
6	Fahadullah	The Oberoi-Trident Hotel	OTH
7	Baba Imran	Nariman House	NH
8	Nasir	Nariman House	NH

9	Ismail Khan	Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus	CST
10	Ajmal Amir Kasab	Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus	CST

As mentioned earlier, techniques like SNA can help in the visualisation of a network by using a two-dimension graph, which helps to understand the overall structure of the network. The software we use for the construction of 26/11 network is UCINET which represents, analyses, visualises, and simulates nodes (attackers) and ties (relationships) from the input data. The network thus obtained can help to better understand the whole incident and can shed light on the pattern of interaction.

To start with, we first form the adjacency matrix as defined in section 3.1. From the government of India's report [5], we found that the attackers reportedly used satellite phones and were in frequent contact with their handlers in Pakistan. They received calls from the handlers during the siege to discuss their plans and routes. The phone conversations between these attackers and remote handlers in Pakistan were intercepted by Indian government and are given in the report [5]. The adjacency matrix in Table 3 represents the binary relationships between the attackers and the handlers determined through the contextual background. If we find a conversation was established between the two people, value one is assigned in the matrix, for no conversation the value remains zero (Table 3).

Table 3: Connections established between attackers and handlers at the time of incident.

	Abu Kaahfa	Wassi	Zarar	Hafiz Arshad	Javed	Abu Shoaib	Abu Umer	Abdul Rehman	Fahadullah	Baba Imran	Nasir	Ismail Khan	Ajmal Amir Kasab
Abu Kaahfa		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wassi	1		1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1		
Zarar	1	1		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hafiz Arshad	0	1	0		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Javed	0	0	0	1		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abu Shoaib				1	1		1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abu Umer	0	1	0	1	1	1		0	0	0	0	0	0
Abdul Rehman	1								1				
Fahadullah	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0
Baba Imran	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
Nasir	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
Ismail Khan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1
Ajmal Amir Kasab	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	

Source: Adapted from information provided by Government of India in Dossier, 2008[5].

From the collected information it is found that during the attack, 13 terrorists played the major role (as listed in Table 1, 2). Their network is drawn on the basis of their telephonic conversations using software UCINET and depicted in Fig.3. Such graphs are commonly used to visualise which nodes (terrorists) are highly connected. Terrorists are located at equal distances, and nodes that are highly connected are very easy to locate because of the density of lines. The

overall structure looks like a centralised star-type network (Fig. 1b) where Wassi, a handler from Pakistan is the most centrally placed terrorist. The attackers Ismail Khan and Ajmal Kasab are isolated in the network. The density of the network, which is an indicator of connectedness of the network, is found to be 0.22. The limiting value of density is one when all the nodes are connected with each other and zero when all nodes are not connected. In the present study, the value for density is 0.2 attributed to the open structure of this terrorist network. Further, this network (Fig. 3) is divided into three sub-groups, which are coloured to identify which terrorist is a member of which group.


Fig.3: Terrorist network for 26/11 attack based on intercepted phone calls.

Our network analysis reveals that the following sub-groups operated at the time of incident:

1. The terrorists divided themselves into five subgroups in charge of five locations.

2. Fahadullah and Abdul Rehman took charge of the Oberoi-Trident Hotel; Ismail Khan and Ajmal Amir Kasab went to the Chhatrapati Shivaji rail terminus; Nazir & Baba Imran attacked the Israeli chabad at Nariman House; Abu Umer and Hafiz

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Arshad took possession of Leopold Café and Abu Shoaib & Javed went to the Taj Mahal hotel. It appears that Abu Umer and Hafiz Arshad joined the two terrorists at the Taj hotel after they finished with Café Leopold.

3. Each sub-group, with the exception of the one at the CST, was in touch with a handler in Pakistan. Wassi in Pakistan turns out to be the key handler. He directed the attack at Oberoi-Trident Hotel through Zarar and Abu Kaahfa. Wassi personally directed the attacks at Nariman House, Café Leopold and the Taj Mahal Hotel.

4. Although Ismail Khan was reportedly the leader of the entire group, he got killed at CST and his partner was taken into custody.

To further study the interaction between individuals, degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector are evaluated and given in Table 4. These indices are a measure of the centrality of the network and indicate hierarchal prestige, importance and power of individuals. It reveals patterns of interactions and associations and can be helpful for revealing the overall structure of terrorist networks under study. It is found that Wassi with highest value of eigenvector, betweenness , closeness, and degree can be identified to be the most important person in Pakistan who was handling the entire operation. Other important persons were Abu Umer, Hafiz Arshad, Abu Shoaib and Javed.

Table 4: Various networks' parameters for all the terrorists understudy

S.No.	Terrorist Names	Abbreviations	Degree	Closeness	Betweenness	Eigenvector
1	Abu Kaahfa	P	25.000	26.667	11.364	29.191
2	Wassi	P	50.000	30.000	50.000	62.844
3	Zarar	P	25.000	26.667	11.364	29.191
4	Hafiz Arshad	LC	33.333	27.273	10.606	64.497
5	Javed	TMH	25.000	23.529	0.000	50.672
6	Abu Shoaib	TMH	25.000	23.529	0.000	50.672
7	Abu Umer	LC	33.333	27.273	10.606	64.497
8	Abdul Rehman	OTH	16.667	23.077	0.758	11.467
9	Fahadullah	OTH	16.667	23.077	0.758	11.467
10	Baba Imran	NH	8.333	24.490	0.000	17.724
11	Nasir	NH	8.333	24.490	0.000	17.724
12	Ismail Khan	CST	8.333	8.333	0.000	-0.000
13	Ajmal Amir Kasab	CST	8.333	8.333	0.000	-0.000

5. Summary and Conclusions

SNA can be a powerful tool for understanding the complex nature of terrorist organisations. Even the limited information available from open sources has helped create a fairly clear picture of the details of the terrorist group and its sub-groups. The security agencies, which routinely intercept phone conversations, emails etc. can use SNA techniques to identify the nodes in a complex network and evaluate their importance in the hierarchy. The identification of type of terror networks would provide useful inputs to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts.

However, it must be mentioned that SNA alone would not suffice for unravelling the modus operandi of terrorist networks. Inputs from the traditional methods of analysing terror networks will be required. SNA can help in providing additional insights that may not be available from other methods.

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Security, Identity, and the Discourse of Conflation in Far-Right Violence

by Jeffrey Stevenson Murer

Abstract:

In the aftermath of Anders Breivik's shooting spree and bombing in Norway, many people asked where did the anger and the violence come from? The article examines the contemporary trends in political and social discourses to conflate opponents with enemies. Popular discourses, television and on-line media, radio talk shows and even newspaper spread the language of threat and insecurity, and the idea that the biggest threats may be the people in our own neighbourhoods, in our own cities, on our own streets. These threatening individuals are those that do not quite fit in; they are familiar foreigners. Similarly it explores the discourses of who should be afforded trust and protection within multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural political and social environments, who exhibits social membership and who should be excluded. The language of austerity and shortage suggests that security is not a human right that all people are entitled to equally. Rather if states can only afford to protect certain people, then by default the state chooses to actively not protect others. This article explores the social and physical consequences these decisions have, particularly when certain individuals decide that they will do what others only talk about: eliminate enemies.

It is our own wickedness -not foreigners. We have produced the poison.

 -- Norwegian Professor Thomas Hylland Eriksen [1]

There is no Roma problem; rather there is a Nazi Problem.[2]

-- Former Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány

Prologue:

In autumn 2010 immigrant communities and people of color in Malmö, Sweden had good reason to be afraid. In September's parliamentary election a small far-right political party that wishes to significantly curtail rights and access for immigrants -- Sweden Democrats (SD) -- cleared the threshold, garnering 6% of the vote, and won 20 seats. The party, which demands cuts in immigration, described Islam as Sweden's biggest threat since the Second World War.[3] In inflammatory television advertisements, which Swedish TV4 refused to air, the SD depicted a group of figures dressed in Burkas, jostling against an elderly white woman, pushing a walker no

less, to get to the head of the benefits queue. The voice over said "politics is all about priorities; now you have a choice." Coincident to this small party's significant electoral showing, immigrants and minorities were being targeted by a gunman as they waited at lonely bus stops, walked along footpaths, or just sat in their cars.Although the shooting spree began nearly a year before the September election, there was a sense that the pace of the shootings quickened following the elections. In total there were twenty-one shootings, which killed one person and injured many others.[4] The daughter of Turkish immigrants, who was afraid to go outside, told BBC Radio 4 that she was angry that her "entire life is being dictated by a single gunman."[5] Indeed the gunman held Malmö rapt. Dubbed the "Race Gunman"[6] or the 'racist sniper", Peter Mangs was eventually arrested on 7 November and was formally charged with one count of murder and five counts of attempted murder on 27 January 2011.[7] Unfortunately this was not the first time this kind of thing has happened, nor would it be the last.

Selecting Targets:

After the July 2011 shootings in Norway, media and political attention shifted to examine threats posed from far-right political extremists, and rightfully so. Although the Oslo car bomb and subsequent mass shooting took much of the mainstream press and so-called median voters across Europe by surprise, elements of the far-right have been in action for a quite some time, and more recently their violence has escalated, intensified, and grown more protracted. This article examines how such intense, and at times widespread violence goes largely unnoticed; it also examines whom is targeted by these groups, and how mainstream politics support and even legitimate this violence.

In June 2011 the U.N. agency for refugees, the UNHCR, issued warnings that in certain Athens neighborhoods "fascist groups had established their own lawless regimes."[8] During three days of racist attacks in May, gangs of neo-fascists rampaged through prominently Asian and African immigrant areas stabbing more than 25 people. In reaction the UNHCR wrote: "there has been a dangerous escalation in…racist violence targeting indiscriminately aliens, based solely on their skin color."[9] Naim Elgandour, the Egyptian born head of the Muslim Association in Greece told the Associate Press that he believed that there may be as many as 5,000 active hardcore right-wing extremists in Athens alone, who "are gaining sympathy and tolerance by the day."[10] Gone from far-right politics is the stigma associated with the military dictatorship that ruled Greece from 1967-1974. But this is not a new phenomenon. Twenty years ago immigrants were being targeted for their skin color at the opposite end of Europe, in an area long thought of for its tolerance and social democracy.

From August 1991 to January 1992 John Ausonius shot eleven people in Stockholm and Uppsala, killing one. He became known popularly and in the media as "Laserman" as he used a laser-guided sight on his rifle. As T-shirts appeared on the streets of Stockholm celebrating his exploits, it became clear that the violence directed at Stockholm's immigrant communities was different.[11] It was violence directed at the *other*. Quickly Laserman became a local "hero", taking upon himself what so many others would only talk about. For those that lionized him knew that they would never be the target of his rage or rifle, for they felt themselves to be, and obviously recognizable as, "true Swedes." Arrested in 1992 and sentenced to life in prison in 1994, Ausonius gave extensive interviews to Gellert Tamas, to whom he admitted that he was inspired by the 1991 election debates about immigrants, when a similar, small vehemently anti-immigrant party, New Democracy, set the tone and terms of debate, won a number of seats in the parliament, and set about to denounce and limit any immigrants' access to the largess of the state. Ausonius told Tamas that he "felt moral support; that the people stood behind him." He stated explicitly that he felt " political support from the (populist anti-immigrant party) New Democracy, and also from other political parties."[12] He felt he was doing the right thing in defense of Swedish people.

With Anders Breivik's recent car bombing in Oslo, and shooting spree on Utøya Island, the specter of the far-right rising over the European political landscape has been recognized. While it may be easy to dismiss his claim that he acted to defend a Christian Europe as that of a single, perhaps deranged, individual acting alone, he was inspired by the political climate around him. Beyond Oslo he reached out to groups like the English Defense League (EDL), although there is no sign of a larger conspiracy with the group for further action. Nevertheless, prominent British businessman and funder of the EDL, Alan Lake, appeared on Norwegian Television saying that he would be happy to execute extremist Muslims. *The Independent* reports that Lake said: "[Such Muslims] are not respecting that which respects the state and as far as I am concerned I'd be happy to execute people like that."[13] Broader political society often takes solace in the notion that such utterances are anomalous, and that such individuals are rare, isolated, loners, and yet these individuals often act out the implied imperatives of mainstream discourses and political themes. These themes are becoming increasing expressed in dire terms, which allow for no compromise, suggest that "whole ways of life" may be in danger of becoming extinct, and require steadfast and decisive action.

Ideocide: You are with us or against us!

Since 9/11 the political discussion surrounding terrorism in the mainstream media has been flat. One factor is a tendency in the US and UK for the "media to ignore the social causes of

terrorism."[14] Rather terrorists are treated as objects of fear, and as such they are not social or political beings. This forestalls the possibility of engaging in any reasonable debate; it also renders such actors as essentially non-political. Aly and Green suggest that the result is a notion that "terrorists are motivated by inner torments and not politics."[15] What motivates the terrorist is that "they hate us" or "they hate our freedom" or "our way of life." All "terrorists" become linked together regardless of their political environments, and as such are characterized by their non-normative behavior. The flipside of this proposition becomes that all people who engage in "non-normative behavior", those who engage positions outside of what is perceived as mainstream political activity, can come to be seen as "terrorists." During the "Dirty War" in Argentina (1976-1983) this sentiment was pervasive following General Jorge Rafael Videl's declaration: "A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization."[16]

Arjun Appadurai has identified such assertions as "ideocide", whereby people, concepts and ways of life come to be regarded as so noxious and so "outside the circle of humanity as to comprise an appropriate target for what Orlando Patterson called 'social death.'"[17] The danger is to mistake a critique of hegemonic discourse as an act standing "outside of the circle of humanity." Those cast as "them" are subject to threats of violence in the name of self-defense by the group-self, which is defined as those being under threat from the "violence" of the other. In this way, the boundary between "us" and "them" is set through two performative acts: the first is the act of feeling threatened. If you are not under threat, if you do not feel threatened by an insurgent minority, then you are not part of the "substantive majority" under threat. The second is to act against the "threat" – the minority. This may appear tautological but it is an important act of distinction: what the "substantive majority" has in common is the feeling of being under threat.

Those who do not share this fear are either part of the threating minority, insinuating the paranoid-schizoid construction of "you are with us or against us", or they are part of the "substantive majority" but do not know it yet. This itself is a conflation, for it shifts the understanding of the role of minority as a dynamic, liberal, procedural concept – one which is in constant flux and reorganization – to an ethno-linguistic-cultural one that is fixed and engaged in a static zero-sum game. Here the dissenter – the procedural minority of opinion – is linked to a threat to transform the majority into a minority; that is, the minority represents a threat to defeat all that the "majority" stands for. The very existence of an oppositional minority is noxious to the majority. But this too morphs a particular political position into "substantive majority." These are what Appadurai describes as "predatory identities", which incite self-understood or declared "majorities to fear that they are becoming minorities, and fear that minorities are becoming majorities."[18]

In defense against small numbers becoming large, some take matters into their own hands, transforming social death into physical death. In these moments of fear – fear of the economy, of terrorism, of the uncertain and the unknown – the paranoid-schizoid position that divides the world into "us" and "them" engenders discourses to eliminate the threat – to eliminate the other. Just as political discourse can mobilize civic action, so too can it mobilize violent action. This conflation of opponents and enemies transforms potential allies into adversaries, both discursively and socially Discursively the "majority" claims the right or the power to define membership in the collective, often in a fashion beyond both normative and juridical practice. Yet, it is not a right for them to claim.

In practice, this hostility, this intolerance, makes it difficult for members of a society who have been declared as "other" to believe they are welcome within the very society they call home. It becomes increasingly difficult to have deep emotional attachments to a place or society that is discriminatory, prejudiced, or actively working to frighten, displace, or harm you. This can lead to a vicious circle in which those who are rhetorically "expelled" retreat into their own neighborhoods, cultural practices, or social networks.[19] The act of seeking moral and social support among allies can be read as disengagement, often by the very initiators of the rhetorical expulsion. Through the construction of a narrative disengagement of the other, the initiators of the rhetoric of expulsion often justify physical acts of violence against the other; any resistance is further proof of their very "otherness." It is a rhetorical trap with potentially physically harmful consequences. In the name of being fearful, members of the self-described or proclaimed majority, commit acts of violence that terrify other communities.

For example, Krisztina Morvai, a Member of the European Parliament from the Hungarian political party *Jobbik* – a Hungarian play on words meaning both the better choice and a more right-wing option, and which *The Guardian* recent described as a "neo-fascist party[20] -- nominated György Budaházy for the Council of Europe's Human Rights Prize for languishing in a Hungarian jail for more than a year without being charged.[21] Only a few days later, Budaházy and sixteen associates were indicted on suspicion to commit terrorism for bomb plots, attacks on journalists including the severe beating of a television presenter, arson attacks, bomb making, and the fire bombings of homes and buildings belonging to Socialist politicians. Morvai can often been seen walking the halls of the European Parliament in Brussels wearing a "Free Budhazáy" t-shirt.[22]

As *Jobbik* and the right in general have continued to garner political strength in Hungary recently, much of their rhetoric has centered on the question of who is a "true Hungarian." In April 2011, the Hungarian Red Cross offered bus evacuation to nearly three hundred Roma who feared further attacks on their village of Gyöngyöspata, which had been under "patrol" for four weeks by the *Jobbik* supported group Civil Guard Association for a Better Future (*Szebb Jövőért*

Polgárőr Egyesület). According to Hungarian Watch, the group woke Roma residents in the night, prevented them from going about their business, threatened them with weapons, and severely beat 17.[23] The *Szebb Jövőért* claimed that they were trying to protect Hungarians and prevent "Gypsycrime".[24] The *Jobbik* Member of Parliament Gergely Rubi said that the group was in Gyöngyöspata to "improve public order and security."[25] The suggestion is that Roma are not in need of security or protection, but are the threat, to which the former Hungarian Prime Minister Fernec Gyurcsány replied: "there is no Roma problem, there is a Nazi problem."[26]

Muslim = Threat

In Denmark, the distinction between "New Danes" and unqualified Danes represents the boundary between entitlement to state benefits as the autochthonous, and the perpetually insecure position of being [barely] tolerated as the allochthonous. In the Netherlands Geert Wilders' growing political prominence appears to signal the continued collapse of tolerance that was notably initiated with the parliamentary bid of Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Wilders has echoed many of Fortuyn's sentiments, such as writing in the *De Volkskrant* "I have had enough of Islam in the Netherlands; let not one more Muslim immigrate."[27] He has called the Koran a "fascist book" which should be banned, and his denouncements of Islam have been so inflammatory that he is presently being tried in court for "inciting hatred against Muslims."[28] Similar to the electoral performance of *Jobbik*, and better than that of the Sweden Democrats, Wilders' Freedom Party is the third largest party in the Netherlands, having won 24 of the 150 seats in last summer's parliamentary election. The entire freedom Party campaign can be seen as a screed against Muslims in the Netherlands.

Unfortunately there has also been a shift in the United States whereby "Muslim" is becoming a pejorative term, suggesting outsider status and indicating potential danger. Much of this rhetoric has been associated with the U.S. Tea Party movement, and became prominent over last summer's plans for an Islamic cultural center to be built in Lower Manhattan, a number of blocks away from World Trade Centre reconstruction site. These plans suddenly became described as the "plot" to build a "mosque at Ground Zero", and sparked heated partisan debate across the American polity. In towns far from New York, often with few Muslims, similar debates and controversy roiled over during the long hot days of summer. At the end of August 2010, gunshots were fired at mosque in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, a suburb of Nashville, not long after that state's lieutenant governor, said at a rally of opponents to the Murfeesboro mosque, "that is Islam is a cult and not a religion."[29] In front of a Temecula, California mosque one protestor held aloft a sign that read "Mosques are Monuments to Terrorism." [30]

But not only are Muslims perceived as enemies, but enemies are perceived as Muslim. In an August 2010 Pew Charitable Trust poll, nearly one-in-five Americans believed that President Obama is a Muslim. Moreover this mistaken view -- Obama is a practicing Christian – has a political hue to it. 34% conservative Republicans believe that Obama is a Muslim compared with the 18% of the general voting age population; likewise 30% of those who disapprove of the president's job performance, believe he is a Muslim. This belief has grown since Obama took office, rising sharply from 11% of the general population in March of 2009 to the current 18%. When asked how they learned of Obama's religion, 60% of respondent cite the "media" and 11% say they have "learned this through Obama's own word and behaviors."[31] It is in this claim that the consequences of such a discursive conflation become increasingly apparent and perhaps dangerous. We see a collapse of the distinction between opponent and enemy here, as Obama's political opponents see him as a political enemy.

Guns Don't Kill People: (Non)Political Violence in the U.S.

Not only "terrorists" are "wanted dead or alive" in the U.S.; the political adversaries of the Tea Party movement and other conservatives were "targeted", as are other "enemies" of the American way of life. In the run-up to 2010 mid-term Congressional elections Republican senatorial candidate Sharon Angle of Nevada told a conservative radio talk show host Lars Larson "if Congress keeps going the way that it is, people are looking toward Second Amendment remedies."[32] Asked later about the meaning of the comment, Larson said that "if [Congress] continues to do the things it's doing, she left open the possibility of armed insurrection."[33] Robert Spitzer, author of *The Politics of Gun Control* said Angle's intention was clear. Speaking on the radio show *Fresh Air,* Spritzer said of Angle's comments: "Its meaning is clear; 'if I do not get my way in the electoral process, I reserve for myself the right to pick up a gun and to see that I get my way in the political realm.' Her comment is the intersection of politics and armed violence."[34]

The U.S. politician Sarah Palin identified twenty key congressional seats as essential to roll back the policies of the Obama administration. Each of these twenty seats was indicated with a gun sight over the district on a map published on Palin's web site in March of 2010. Following the publication of the map, three campaign headquarters of democratic candidates in these districts were attacked and vandalized. One of those targeted, Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, told MSNBC's Chuck Todd "Palin put crosshairs of a gun sight over our district; when people do that, they've got to realize there's consequences."[35] Todd responded, "campaign rhetoric and war rhetoric have always been interchangeable", not noticing the very example of calling the period approaching an election a "campaign" is a military metaphor. But Giffords held fast,

suggesting something was notably aggressive about the then recent rhetoric She said that colleagues from the House of Representatives with tenures of "20, 30 years" have said they have never seen vitriol like this.[36] It appeared that opponents were no longer part of the group self. As these opponents are seen as members of the other, and not merely part of a loyal opposition (never mind that these elements actually were the government and often are a numerical majority or at least plurality in opinion polling), it is permissible to target them with threats of violence, if not actual violence.

Giffords was threatened again at an August 2010 Tucson campaign rally; an attendee conspicuously "dropped" a handgun while Giffords defended Obama's policies. Tucson Tea Party co-founder Trent Humphries told the *Arizona Daily Star* that Giffords misread the dropped gun, saying "no one is targeting Gabi."[37] How wrong he was. On 7 January 2011, Giffords was shot point-blank in the head along with 19 other people, six of whom died, including nine-year old, Christina Green, and U.S. Federal judge John Roll. Investigators found that the shooter Jared L. Loughner, had engaged in methodical and meticulous planning, including hand written notes detailing his intensions that included the heading "I planned ahead."[38]

These were not the only attacks in response to Obama's policies On 18 July 2010 Byron Williams was involved in a shootout with two California Highway Patrol officers. His mother told the *San Francisco Chronicle* that he was "upset by the way Congress was railroading through all of these left-wing agenda items."[39] He was on his way to "begin a revolution" by attacking a California NGO, Tides, which had "become something of a whipping boy of [the U.S. conservative television personality Glenn] Beck."[40] Beck stated frequently on his programme that the founder of the organization, Van Jones, was a "communist" responsible for "shaping the views of the President of the United States." However, following the shooting Bryon Williams was simply described as "disturbed", as was the "distraught" man who, in an eerie echo of 9/11, flew his private plane into the Austin, Texas offices of the Internal Revenue Service, killing himself, an IRS manager, and injuring 13 others in February 2010.[41] In April 2009 white supremacist Richard Poplawski went on a shooting spree killing three Pittsburgh police officers, and wounding a fourth; press reports described him as "nothing but trouble,"[42] just as Jared Loughner was repeatedly described as "distraught and disturbed." The connection between the acts of violence themselves and a permissive environment of public officials appearing to condone violence, is undermined by the parallel claims that the perpetrators of violence were disturbed, mentally unbalanced individuals, acting alone.

Autochthones and Allochthones: A Conclusion

These political and social reactions to distinguish between a wholly known and familiar "us" and a threatening and alien "them" is associated with what Appadurai described as the complex response to intolerable levels of uncertainty about group identities.[43] Appadurai describes how the contemporary exercises of "counting" and "naming" populations for the purposes of determining access to resources, privileges of voting and citizenship, as well as mobility and accumulation, creates a situation whereby "large numbers of people [turn] immoderately suspicious about the "real" identities of their neighbors."[44] Those suspicious of the other then work to identify further "insurgents" who wear "false masks" and who "pretend" to support the majority but in truth work against it.

This is linked to the concept of "autochthony" where claims to citizenship, rights, even the idea of personhood, are tied to one's ability to demonstrate that they come from a particular place, as opposed to migrants or foreigners. Baukje Prins and Sawitri Saharso describe how in the Netherlands, there is a growing "gap between 'autochthones and 'allochthones', between those who are already a (integrated) part of the social body, and those who are constituted as its 'outside.'"[45] In places of melding cultures, labour migration, asylum seeking, and great human flows, this is a very disturbing idea. Extreme violence emerges when social trust erodes and the very existence of the other is seen as a threat Markers of everyday distinction such as speaking a different first language, or having an unfamiliar name, or eating unfamiliar foods, or practicing a different faith, quickly becomes indexes of different worldviews, and perhaps having different social values and mores. This shift entails an assertion of the ubiquity of certain cultural practices and normative positions, whereby difference becomes equated with foreignness. But such assertions ignore that there may have been differences all along, subtle and quiet differences that existed peacefully and easily with an assumption of homogeneity, even when it never existed. Difference becomes pertinent when it is accentuated and foregrounded.

These shifts come not only from propaganda and the rants of television and radio broadcasts and large-scale politics, but also from the very near, the very local, or from what Appadurai calls "the wounds of everyday life."[46] Encounters and scuffles bring misunderstandings and minor grudges, which grow with the powerful social fertilizer of rumor. Larger narratives of social distrust, providing the "proof" and the "truth" of the alien and threatening qualities of the other, validate these little doubts and suspicions, these misgivings and perceptions of betrayal. It is a powerful and destructive cycle whereby all parties know the "truth" about the other, and each encounter creates a new gaffe or misstep that increases the breadth and depth of the cleavages between groups.

For Will Kymlicka the most dangerous situation arises when the state tries to manage the social and political rifts within the polity through securitization. In such circumstances those deemed to be a threat become the objects of suspicion, surveillance, and interdiction in the name of protecting others not deemed to pose a threat. In such cases relations between minority groups and the majority population are not a matter of normal debate, negotiation and discursive encounter, mediating demands for resource allocations or access to social spaces and position. Rather the relationship between the minority and the rest of the population is a matter of security services minimizing threat potential. In such circumstances the state will "limit the democratic process to protect itself,"[47] possibly resulting in the prohibition of political or social mobilisation, or the denial of avenues of redress or grievance articulation. Kymlicka asserts that the logic of securitization itself "erodes both the democratic space to voice minority demands and the likelihood that those demands would be accepted."[48] Here appears the danger from the far-right; demands for cultural and political homogeneity denies the expression of dissent in its many forms. Hungarians who work to protect Roma come to be seen as not "true Hungarians"; Anders Breivik attacked the Labour party's summer camp because he believed that institution was responsible for increased immigration, about which there could be no further discussion. When ideas are seen as threats to security, when there can be no more discussion, then politics have become poisonous. Kymlicka concludes that social group relations have to be "taken out of the 'security' box and placed back into the 'democratic politics' box.[49] Until that happens perhaps the people of Malmö still have reason to be afraid.

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The Impact of Food Consumption, Government Type and Effectiveness, on the Rate of Somali Maritime Piracy, 2000-2008

by Sam Rohrer

Abstract

The analysis of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa is still a developing area of academic research. The work that has been conducted to date has remained largely qualitative. Two recurring assumptions made but not empirically tested in this area of research are 1) the perceived link between government stability and the rate of maritime piracy, and 2) drought conditions implying food shortages in Somalia, and their impact on the rate of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa The findings of this project show a strong increase in maritime piracy following the transition from assorted Islamic Courts to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). However, variations in the consumption of staple foodstuffs, and an index of the World Bank Governance Indicators do not have a significant impact on the frequency of maritime piracy in the region. If maritime piracy off the Somali coast is to be eliminated, rather than policed, efforts should be made to encourage the development of governmental institutions that utilize culturally-respected institutions supported by the local populace.

Introduction

Maritime piracy in the Straits of Malacca and off the Horn of Africa has been a recurring topic in the realm of government case studies and think tank analyses. From 2000 on it has gradually emerged as a topic of interest in scholarly academic articles. The majority of the existing work on maritime piracy, regardless of position, is qualitative; there are few quantitative articles addressing modern maritime piracy. The quantitative studies that have been conducted find that maritime piracy is not random; the type of ship and flag it flies are statistically significant factors[1], and as governmental stability shifts from weak to failed, there will be an increase in the rate of kidnappings as compared to theft of property due to the degradation of transportation infrastructure[2].

Two recurring assumptions made, but not empirically tested, in the literature are 1) the perceived link between government stability and the rate of maritime piracy[3],[4],[5] , and 2) drought conditions, implying food shortages, in Somalia, and their impact on the rate of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa[6],[7]. This project rectifies this issue by quantitatively testing the impact of the transition from assorted Islamic Courts to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), an

index of the World Bank Governance Indicators, and staple food consumption on the rate of maritime piracy off the Somali coast. The findings of this project make a significant contribution to the field because they find a statistically significant link between the transition from Islamic Courts to the TFG and the rate of maritime piracy off the Somali coast; and a statistically insignificant relationship between the consumption of staple food stuffs, and the World Bank Governance Indicators on the rate of maritime piracy off the Somali coast.

Causes of Piracy

Before the broader questions regarding modern maritime piracy can be debated, one must first ask, what are the sources that lead to the development of modern maritime piracy, and are they any different from the sources of historical maritime piracy? To answer the latter half of this question, there does not appear to be a significant difference in the causes of piracy that are unique to any particular point in history. There are likely many factors that contribute directly or indirectly: civil war, war, poverty, maritime experience, etc. However, there are four broad criteria that are generally present: 1) desperation, 2) opportunity, 3) sanctuary, and 4) leadership[8].

Historically, individuals who turn to piracy have done so in an attempt to avoid a Hobbesian life, which is dull, nasty, brutish, and short. In doing so, they achieve wealth and potentially some degree of fame[9],[10]. This initial condition has held true from the Illyrian pirates prior to Roman annexation, to the American colonies in the 1500s, through to contemporary Somalia and Aceh. The desire for economic gain suggests that pirates are rational actors acting in their own self-interests, and capable of sound cost-benefit decision making. The second criterion – opportunity – exists when an individual has either seagoing experience or access to port communities with sufficient commercial traffic to target. The third – sanctuary – is vital. In order to launch naval raids, pirates require sympathizers, protectors, financiers, and commercial outlets for stolen goods or hostages, and generally some level of tolerance by the local government[11]. Finally, after these criteria are met, maritime piracy can lead to the development of sophisticated local economies, with the protection of local political figures, and capable of supporting small armadas[12].

In recent years, piracy has developed into a highly lucrative trade; in 2007 the average ransom for a ship has been estimated at $800,000, increasing to $1,600,000 per ship by the end of 2008, reaching as high as $2,500,000 in early 2009[13],[14]. The apparent economic success of Somali piracy has led to the development of an extensive network of negotiators, spokesmen, logistic coordinators, and financial launderers[15],[16].

Similar Causes: Piracy and Terrorism

In addition to maritime piracy, the motivating factors of desperation and opportunity have been applied in research explaining the recruitment, and efficacy of terrorist organizations. Blomberg et. al. found that economic contractions are positively correlated with increases in terrorist violence[17]. Honaker disaggregated Catholic and Protestant data in Ireland, and found that increases in Catholic unemployment led to increases in Republican violence, and increases in Protestant unemployment led to increases in Loyalist violence[18]. Sufficient economic contractions and increases in unemployment create a sense of desperation within certain levels of a society. The differentiating factor between desperate individuals resorting to maritime piracy in Somalia as compared to terrorism in Ireland can be attributed to opportunity. Somalia possesses a unique combination of traits: a collapsed state located near vulnerable sea lanes, a desperate coastal population with sea faring experience seeking economic relief from a bleak situation, and a relative dearth of terrorist organizations that could provide financial incentives for joining immediately following the collapse of the Barre government in 1991. Whereas in Ireland a stable and effective state apparatus remained in place, the volume of maritime trade was lower and less vulnerable, and desperate individuals could join an established well-funded terrorist organization in an attempt to rectify the perceived wrongs that led to their desperate state of being.

Governmental Collapse and the Emergence of Piracy in Somalia

The romanticized image of the pirate pillaging at sea, with no ties to land or civilization outside of the confines of the ship, is clearly a fallacy. As discussed in the root causes of piracy, ports of call are required for any maritime raid. Thus, the ability of government to exert control over territory effectively, and reduce or eliminate conditions that encourage criminal activity, is vital. In this sense, piracy is no different from land-based smuggling or bootlegging operations. This position has been repeatedly stressed in the existing literature[19],[20].

The fluctuating environment that allowed piracy to develop along the Somali coast has been linked to the collapse of the government of Siad Barre in 1991. Barre's government ceased functioning following clan-based power struggles that began in 1988. The state of Somalia proceeded to fracture into three primary zones. The eastern coastline, occupying the territory of the former Italian Somaliland, split into the semiautonomous region of Puntland in the north and the southern portion of the nation, including the capital Mogadishu, has remained a conflict-prone region. From 2000-2005 an assortment of Islamic courts came into existence and served as a form of domestic government, and criminal court system[21]. In 2006 a formal government based on this system, called the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), was implemented; it governed the majority of this region until the end of the year, with a degree of popular support[22]. At this

point the TFG, supported by the Ethiopian government, supplanted the ICU, and sought to establish the Western-backed TFG as the legitimate governing authority in Somalia[23]. The northern portion of the country, Somaliland, considers itself independent. Contrary to the rest of Somalia, this region is relatively stable, and has developed a government combining Western democratic structures with local clan-based hierarchies[24].

The TFG has encountered difficulty establishing itself as the legitimate national government. This is in part due to unique cultural traits of the Somali identity. A cautious attitude towards outsiders is a common theme, illustrated by Somali fishing communities turning to piracy after initially protecting Somali waters from foreign dumping and fishing[25],[26]. The hierarchy of priorities, expressed in an old Somali proverb, suggests that resisting outside forces is a cause to which most Somalis should rally, overlooking existing clan and family-based disagreements. If this attitude has carried into the contemporary Somali identity, it could explain why foreign efforts to reduce criminal activity/maritime piracy, and encourage the development of the TFG, have met with resistance.

> Me and my clan against the world. Me and my family against my clan. Me and my brother against my family. Me against my brother[27].

Somali Piracy: Unique Threat and Links to Terrorist Organizations

Piracy hotspots exist throughout the globe, so why is Somali piracy considered to be potentially more troublesome than that of the Gulf of Guinea or South China Sea? Unlike piracy in other regions, the range of operations for Somali pirates has increased markedly. Previously focused on the strategic chokepoint of the Gulf of Aden, Somali pirates now operate deep into the West Indian Ocean in an area that is estimated to cover 1-2.5 million square miles[28],[29]. The large range of operations, and Somalia's "failed state" status, create a nexus of concern for security analysts when the issue of terrorism is considered. The worst-case scenario is the emergence of a government that is strong enough to control piracy, but chooses not to control it, and stable enough to provide protection for Islamist terrorist organizations[30].

The legitimacy of this fear is a recurring topic of debate in the field. In the 2008 Rand Corporation report, *The Maritime Dimensions of International Security,* and the 2009 Danish Institute for International Studies report *Piracy Terrorism, and Naval Strategy*, maritime pirates and terrorists are defined as entirely separate actors. Terrorists are motivated for some higher political cause, and pirates are motivated by financial gain. At a base level this distinction is intuitive. However, it overlooks the commonalities shared by terrorists and maritime pirates.

As discussed in the Council of Foreign Relations article "Combating Maritime Piracy," there are two key areas where piracy and terrorism overlap, legal classification and financial ties. First, both groups operate independently of a nation-state, target civilians, and commit acts of homicide and destruction for private ends[31]. Second, evidence exists that pirates have provided funding for terrorist organizations in Somalia and Indonesia[32]. Despite different long-term goals, there is room for collaboration. Maritime piracy can provide radical Islamists with funds to launch terrorist attacks[33]. A potential example of such collaboration was the hijacking of a Greek-owned cargo ship in September 2008. Following seizure it was directed south to a port controlled by Islamists, rather than to an existing pirate base on the Somali coast[34].

Research Questions

Based on the existing literature, two common assumptions surrounding Somali piracy are the perceived links between government stability and food consumption, with the rate of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. In an attempt to quantitatively examine these issues, the following hypotheses will be tested.

H1: As governmental authority decreases the frequency of maritime piracy along the coast of Somalia will increase.

H2: Domestically developed governments incorporating culturally respected institutions will be more effective in decreasing the frequency of maritime piracy along the Somali coast.

H3: When reductions in national food consumption occur, the frequency of maritime piracy along the coast of Somalia will increase.

Dependent Variable

Piracy data was compiled from the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) quarterly reports, specifically, by combining events of piracy and armed robbery against ships that were allegedly *attempted*, and allegedly *committed*, in the region of East Africa from 2000 through 2008. This region was selected because it encompasses attacks along the Somali coast. As previously discussed, piracy is a transnational crime and some Somali pirates now operate well into the Indian Ocean. This is a region also tracked in the IMO reports; the majority of attacks in this region are along the coast of the Indian subcontinent, and it seems unlikely to be associated with Somali piracy. Regarding attacks located further from shore, it would be difficult to determine the originating port of the pirate crew. While pirate bases may exist in other countries in East Africa, the majority of the documented operations are launched from Somali ports.

Additionally, attempted but unsuccessful events of piracy are still relevant when looking at the phenomenon at a regional level.

There are concerns regarding the accuracy of this data. Many shipping companies choose not to file a report regarding a pirate attack so long as the financial and human losses are not high. Underreporting occurs for two main reasons. First, reporting instances of piracy can increase a shipping company's insurance premiums. Second, slowing vessels to complete a formal report can lead to delays in the delivery date of cargo. Thus, some shipping firms prefer to sidestep the process. This has led to claims that statistics regarding maritime piracy may be underreported by as much as 50 percent[35],[36].

Independent Variables

Two measures of government, and one measure of food consumption, will be used in this paper. The first will be measured using the World Bank Governance Indicators. The second, will be a dichotomous variable noting the differences between the TFG formed in exile, and the domestically developed Islamic courts systems. The third independent variable will measure domestic food consumptions in Somalia from 2000-2008.

The World Bank Governance Indicators is a desirable measure, because it is released annually for more than 200 countries. The measure contains six components: 1) "voice and accountability" (the ability of the citizenry to express views and interests, and play a role in selecting the leading figures of their government), 2) political instability and violence, 3) government effectiveness, 4) regulatory burden, 5) "rule of law" (the principle that every member of society must follow the law), and 6) control of corruption[37]. All six of these indicators are scaled in the same manner on a five point scale, and globally ranked by percentile. In order to achieve a single score for each year, the percentile ranking of these six factors will be averaged together into an overall "good governance" indicator, which will be referred to as, the World Bank Governance Index (WBGI) (see tab. 1). Data is available for every year analyzed, 2000-2008, with the exception of 2001. For this period, an average of the 2000 and 2002 indicators will be used.

The dichotomous ICU/TFG variable includes the Shari'a Implementation Council (2000-2003), the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of Somalia (2004-2006), and the Islamic Courts Union (2006) to create a variable that is representative of the increasing prevalence and governing effectiveness of Islamic institutions prior to the TFG from 2000 Q1 until 2006 Q4[38].[39]. The TFG is considered in power or ascendant from the 2007 Q1 until 2008 Q4. While the TFG continued to face resistance from elements of ICU splinter groups, Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen in particular, the TFG was

considered nominally in control of the institutions of government until Ethiopia's withdrawal of military support in 2009[40]. This variable allows for a measure of maritime piracy, both, before and after a clear transition in forms of government.

Food consumption data was collected from Index Mundi, and is based on U.S. Department of Agriculture data[41],[42],[43]. While a variable for total food consumption is not available, consistent data is available for estimated national consumption of wheat, corn, and milled rice for the years 2000-2008. The unit of measure used for the domestic consumption of these three staple foodstuffs is measured in increments equal to 1000 metric tons. Data for these three staple food types will be merged to form a quarterly 'staple food' variable. Food shortages are likely linked to either 1) drought conditions, or 2) dramatic fluctuations in the price of agricultural products within the country. Both could contribute to a weaker government, and encourage more individuals to turn to maritime piracy, but maritime piracy seems unlikely to directly impact drought or food consumption within Somalia.

Tests

The impact of the independent variables - WBGI, the ICU/TFG variable, and measure of domestic food consumption - will be tested using a one-tailed negative binomial regression to determine their impact on the dependent variable: the quarterly incidences of maritime piracy. This method of regression is appropriate when a variable is a "count" (tally of observed events), over-dispersed or under-dispersed, and each subject has the same length of observation. The negative binomial regression is preferable to other count models, such as an ordinary least square (OLS), Poisson, or zero-inflated model when these conditions are present. Count variables often follow a Poisson distribution, which requires the mean and variance to be somewhat similar. This distribution is not present in the dependent variable, which has a mean of 9.861 and a variance of 133.209. The variance of quarterly pirate attacks is nearly 14 times larger than the mean. The distribution is displaying signs of under-dispersion, that is, less variance than might be expected in a Poisson distribution. The quarterly data used in the dependent variable only has a single entry with a value of zero. Thus a zero-inflated model should not be run, as it required repeated entries with a value of zero.

First a standard negative binomial regression will be run in order to determine if the model as a whole is significant. The model will be considered significant if the probability of getting a chi-squared statistic as extreme as that predicted under the null hypothesis, which would predict no relationship, is .05 or less. If the first regression is significant, it will be followed by a robust negative binomial regression. Using a robust negative binomial regression utilizes a more

stringent set of standard errors for the coefficients used in the regression, and adjusts the model to account for heteroskedasticity. Utilizing the robust version of the regression will result in a change in the model chi-square. The chi-square statistic measures the "goodness of fit," meaning the ability of the observed data to deviate from those expected under the null hypothesis. Rather than a likelihood ratio chi-square, the robust negative binomial regression uses a Wald chi-square, which offers a more conservative chi-square estimate. The significance of the independent variables will be based on their z-score, which allows for the standardized comparison of variables with different metrics.

Results

The first negative binomial regression, run using the WBGI, ICU, and staple foods independent variables, against the quarterly incidences of piracy dependent variable, as a whole is statistically significant (see Table 2). The likelihood-ratio chi-square was 21.47. The probability that the chi-square statistic could be the same as that predicted by the null hypothesis, which would expect no relationship between the variables, is 0.0001. This is well within the five-percent-or-less criteria selected to determine the significance of the model as a whole. Additionally, the chi-bar squared with one degree of freedom is 81.56. This confirms negative binomial regression as the appropriate test over other possible regressions. If the chi-bar squared statistic had been closer to zero, for example, a reading of fifty or less, it would suggest that a negative binomial regression would be an inappropriate regression model to use with these variables. Since the model as a whole is significant, the variables will be reanalyzed using the more stringent robust negative binomial regression.

The robust negative binomial regression resulted in an increase in the chi-square which is now a Wald chi-square, moving from 21.47 to 24.67 (see Table 2). This increase indicates that the "goodness of fit" has increased as well. The probability that the chi-square statistic could be the same as that predicted by the null hypothesis has decreased from 0.0001 to 0.0000. The model as a whole remains significant. The variable coded for the transition from Islamic Courts governance to the TFG is significant, as the probability that the z-score is as extreme as that predicted by the null hypothesis is zero. The presence of the ICU results in a decrease of the coefficient equal to -0.165. The WBGI variable is insignificant, as the probability that the z-score for the variable could be predicted by the null hypothesis is 0.538, that is, there is a 53.8% chance that the null hypothesis would predict a similar relationship. The staple food consumption variable is also insignificant, as the probability that the z-score for the variable could be predicted by the null hypothesis is 0.485, there is a 48.5% chance that the null hypothesis would predict a similar relationship.

Discussion of Results

These results disprove H3, that domestic food consumption is significantly linked to maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. They also disprove H1, that fluctuations in the WBGI impact maritime piracy. The predictive power of good government, as measured by the WBGI, is not statistically significant. This is clearly illustrated when the two years of TFG control 2007 and 2008 are compared to the last two years of Islamic Courts governance 2005 and 2006 (see Table 3). The TFG's WBGI ranged from .56-.63, and the ICU's WBGI ranged from .48-.65. During this period of time, under similar measures of governance, the Islamic Courts averaged 9.5 attacks per quarter, as compared to the 24.25 per quarter of the TFG.

However, the test results do confirm H2 in that that the grassroots-developed ICU was significantly more capable of controlling piracy as compared to the Western-backed TFG. The regression suggests that the ICU/TFG variable is capturing some element that influences the ability of government to control maritime piracy, that was present during the rise of assorted Islamic Courts (2000-2006), but not present during the TFG's period of ascendancy (2006-2008). Greater specificity, or additional controls, is not immediately available given the limited nature of data available regarding Somalia following the collapse of the Barre regime.

Limitations

There were multiple limitations to conducting these tests. Locating multiyear indicators of domestic crime, corruption, drought, and domestic income – the standard types of measures collected by most governments – was simply not possible. The data available from international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations was frequently incomplete. For example, Transparency International's corruption index was only sporadically available. Therefore this research relies on information collected by foreign and international organizations that had consistent records ranging from 2000-2008, primarily the U.S. Department of Agriculture via Index Mundi, and the World Bank.

Future Research

The ability to conduct future quantitative research is dependent on consistent data, which may remain indefinitely unavailable. Recognizing that pirates are rational actors, it would be interesting to see if a link exists between some measure of income and the rate of piracy. The ability of pirates to maintain safe havens has also been linked to bribery. Additional annual

indicators of the pervasiveness and institutionalization of corruption could prove to be more accurate indicators than fluctuations in food consumption, or overall measures of governmental effectiveness or composition.

Conclusion

The causes of maritime piracy in Somalia are complex and likely based on multiple factors. However, the existing research in this area has repeatedly stressed the importance of governance and drought-related food shortages as important factors fueling the rise of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The tests conducted for this paper suggest that the former is quantitatively sound and the latter is not. This suggests that effective governance is a central component to controlling maritime piracy, and it is vital that a domestic Somali government is rooted in Somali culture and not airlifted in by a Western power from exile.

If maritime piracy off the Somali coast is to be eliminated rather than policed, efforts should be made to encourage homegrown governmental elements that utilize culturally-respected institutions. Incorporating religious institutions and/or clan-based structures would help create a domestically respected governing base. As illustrated in Somaliland, these cultural institutions can successfully compliment and reinforce democratic institutions. Once established these governing institutions can be strengthened and expanded. Such an approach would incorporate the perceived legitimacy and greater efficacy in controlling maritime piracy held by the ICU from 2000-2006, along with the values of representative government found in Somaliland and favored by the West. This combination of structures would create a Somali government that would be both domestically palatable, internationally accepted, and capable of reducing or eliminating maritime piracy operations based in Somalia.

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Table 1

World Bank Governance Index (Average Percentile of World Bank Goverance Indicators)	
2000	0.82
2001	2.03
2002	3.23
2003	1.70
2004	0.57
2005	0.48
2006	0.65
2007	0.56
2008	0.63

Table 2

Effects of the Annual World Bank Governance Index (WBGI), the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)/Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Dichotomous Variable, and the Consumption of Staple Foodstuffs on Reported Quarterly Incidences of Maritime Piracy in East Africa

Negative Binomial Regression

Significance of the Model as a Whole	
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square	21.47
Probability that the LR Chi-Square is observed under the null hypothesis	0.0001
Chi-Bar Square	81.56

Independent Variables	Coefficient(Standard Error)	Z-Score
World Bank Governance Index	-0.104(0.171)	-0.61
ICU	-1.648(0.471)	-3.50 ***
Staple Food Consumption	0.013(0.019)	0.70

Robust Negative Binomial Regression

Significance of the Model as a Whole	
Wald Chi-Square	24.76
Probability that the Wald Chi-Square is observed under the null hypothesis	0.0000

Independent Variables	Coefficient(Standard Error)	Z-Score
World Bank Governance Index	-0.104(0.169)	-0.62
ICU	-1.648(0.438)	-3.76 ***
Staple Food Consumption	0.013(0.019)	0.70

*** .001 or less, ** .025 or less, *.05 or less

Table 3

Comparison of the two years proceeding and following the ICU/TFG transition

	ICU 2005 Q1 - 2006 Q4	TFG 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4
WBGI Range	.56-.63	.48-.65
Quarterly Average of Incidences of Maritime Piracy	9.5	24.25

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Opinion Piece

Managing the change of context in countering terrorism: Death of Bin Laden and the "Arab Spring"

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In world political history, 2011 will be remembered as the year when the leader of the Al Qaida (AQ) terrorist movement was killed and of the so called "Arab Spring", when mass demonstrations in some Arab countries fundamentally challenged the way these countries have been ruled for the past few decades.

In reality there is no connection between these two developments. Yet, they are both likely to have an impact on AQ affiliated or influenced terrorism. The first may have to do mostly with the internal dynamics of AQ and the second is significant in terms of the socio-political context where AQ and its ideology thrive.

Whether AQ as an organization will survive after the death of Bin Ladin and how it will do that is not only a matter of concern for governments fighting against terrorism but also a matter of interest for the students of terrorism studies. It will be a test case for studying the impact of the loss of a leader on the fate of a "fourth wave" terrorist group [1].

In the same vein, the impact of chaotic winds of change in North Africa and Middle East, towards more democracy and freedom on AQ related or influenced terrorism could put many theories on terrorism to test, such as the links between democracy, failed states, relative deprivation and terrorism. [2]

The strategists of AQ can be expected to follow what has been happening in the Arab street, together with other simultaneous developments in the international fora, such as Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The ideology which they have crafted has so far provided a foundation for the justification of violence to a miniscule number of the frustrated, alienated, seemingly humiliated Muslims of the West as well as the underprivileged Muslims of the developing world. AQ ideology has also managed to inflame Islamophobia in the West, creating new faultlines.

Bin Laden and others, now dead or captured, were not only the founding fathers but also the symbols of this ideology. Bin Laden's death is likely to be turned into a symbol of martyrdom by the remaining AQ strategists, who by now probably have already selected the new "CEO" of AQ Inc.

It would be wise to expect that they are in the planning stage of how to demonstrate to their multiple target audiences that AQ as an organization and as an ideology still lives.

AQ blamed the West and the regimes of the Middle East supported by the West for the sufferings and grievances among the Muslims of the world. Its terrorism targeted Western interests globally. However, its attacks, which were perpetrated in the West, were the most durable in the Western collective memory.

Targeting the West in the West by terrorism was not only aiming at inflicting pain for "revenge", but also a demonstration of power and ensuring more media coverage that helped to increase the impact of terrorist action and to sustain the support of sympathizers / supporters.

This became a preferred tactic particularly due to the reverse correlation between the attention by Western public opinion and the distance of the terrorist threat from the West. Thus, in proof of its survival, AQ will continue to play darts, "bull's eye" being any successful attack in the West.

In the decade that followed 9/11, the West, particularly, Europe, with its resources, systems and institutions managed to harden itself as a target. So, while looking forward to an opportunity to shock the Western public opinion, AQ or groups under its influence will most probably try to sustain their existence by attacking wherever they can. The recent attacks in Pakistan, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen or Morocco could be perceived in that light.

But Europe, too, still has some vulnerabilities.

First, AQ ideology turned out to be appealing to some Muslims of Europe, highlighting understudied problems in Europe's relations with its own Muslim population. [3]

Second, Muslims living in the West have become part of a virtual but global "ummah" thanks to new communication technologies and the way Western governments pursue their foreign policy

became closely linked with how Muslims of Europe align their own perceived or real grievances with those in the less developed democracies and war zones.

Third, despite the "war on terrorism", AQ or other terrorist groups affiliated by a similar ideology are still present in certain places of the globe providing technical knowhow to those who for different reasons became dedicated enemies of their own societies and countries.

Therefore, Europe's security from terrorism, in the medium to long run, is closely related to what goes on in the rest of the world.

And the death of Bin Laden cannot help to address any of the vulnerabilities above.

Yet, it might add to sensitivities, if not vulnerabilities. For instance, it can accelerate a premature waning of the Western attention from Afghanistan. This, may lead to the rebuilding of AQ heritage in Afghanistan by its limbs in Europe, Middle East, Sub-continent and Africa. There is no reason why new generations of AQ and Taleban would not find a friend in each other. Should that reunion happens, like in the past, what goes on in Afghanistan would not stay in Afghanistan. After all these years and efforts, it would be a shame to see the "Afghan Arab" phenomenon re-emerging, only this time with links in Europe as well.

If Afghanistan is left to its fate as such, in combination with the memories of Iraq, the old and new elite of the young democracies of the Middle East may conclude that the support and cooperation of the West is limited to its own, as opposed to common, interests. This perception would deepen the rift between "the West" and "the rest", just as AQ strategists would wish for, with implications on international cooperation against terrorism, in addition to other vital issues.

Moreover, the process of change in the Arab world has only just begun. Though it will follow a different course in each country, transition to democracy, change of elite and redistribution of political/economic power is likely to create in each country some pockets of dissatisfied, frustrated or disillusioned population. AQ should be expected to try to win them over. To this end AQ strategists will watch and try to sabotage or take advantage of the "Arab Spring" and the way it is handled by the West.

AQ will count on the impatience, lack of funds, double standards, patronizing attitudes, narrowed interests on the part of Western Governments as well as social fragmentation, democratic challenges, institutional and economic weaknesses of the Governments of the region for reinforcing and spreading its ideology as well as recruiting new cadres.

While even the most optimist would admit that the death of Bin Laden cannot bring about the end of the AQ terrorist threat by itself, the worst pessimist would agree that this is an opportunity that could weaken AQ and disenchant its supporters. The contextual changes, such as the "Arab Spring" should be properly managed, to seize that opportunity.

Notes

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Disclaimer: *The views reflected in this opinion piece are author's personal views and do not bind the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in any way.*

Book Reviews

Prince, Stephen, *Firestorm. American Film in the Age of Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009 and Cettl, Robert, Terrorism in American Cinema. An Analytical Filmography, 1960 - 2008, Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland & Company, Publishers, 2009. Reviewed by Janka Skrzypek

The attacks of September 11, 2001 ignited a firestorm, indeed. Not only did they result in an outburst of terrorism literature (Silke, in: Ranstorp, 2007: 76-91), they also changed the way terrorism is described and shown (Hall, in: Prince, 2009: 121). If one looks at 9/11 as a watershed, one accepts what had happened before. If one looks at 9/11 as a beginning or something that had emerged out of nowhere, one is guilty of a-historicism.

Prince's 2009 account on American Film in the Age of Terrorism cannot be accused of the latter. Although set during George W. Bush's presidency, Prince's analysis draws heavily on the "ages of terrorism" that America has witnessed since the late 1960s. Prince's focus is on American movies, documentaries and TV series on the 9/11 attack and the war in Iraq, however, and for reasons not explained by the author, not on the campaign in Afghanistan.

Prince provides a very good insight into how the attacks and the subsequent War on Terror came about (by invoking either a description of the decision-making process as such or the data gathered by the 9/11 Commission, for example). What is more, he delivers an interesting analysis of what American cinema looked like during the Bush presidency and how his Administration employed the movie/documentary making industry to create and legitimize its own spectacle of terrorism and/or terrorism of spectacle (Giroux, 2006).

Using the Vietnam War as a main point of reference, Prince claims that the American movie industry is still coming to terms with how to "deal" with the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath. He lists the efforts of finding a "right" narrative and genre to tell the 9/11 stories as part of the ongoing process of adjustment. In his concluding chapter he invokes three movies re-telling the stories of ancient conflicts (Troy, The Kingdom and 300), leaving the reader with a feeling that traumatic events such as the 9/11 attacks are deeply imbedded in the social and cultural history of the world - Western and non-Western, alike. He also argues in favour of documentaries to be able to better capture the essence and complexity of 9/11 images and experiences.

One could criticize Prince for failing to disclose the criteria that guided the choice of works analysed in his book as well as for providing a rather restricted view on the world post-9/11, limited to American televisions only. At the same time, one has to acknowledge the depth and

breadth of his research, the usefulness of the filmography and historical timeline provided as appendices, and the accessibility of Prince's writing, all of which make Firestorm of great interest and use to the students of film, terrorism, politics as well as the general public.

Another 2009 publication worth mentioning in the context of Prince's thought-provoking Firestorm is Cettl's Terrorism in American Cinema. An Analytical Filmography, 1960-2008. Unlike in the case of Prince, Cettl's focus is predominantly on American movies, with only some documentaries mentioned and hardly any analysed. Also, in contrast to Prince, Cettl focuses on films created long before the 9/11 attacks, as well as those not related directly to the War on Terror declared in their aftermath. In addition, such a long timeframe also allows him to set his discussion in reference not only to the Vietnam War, but to the Cold War in general.

Compared to Firestorm, Cettl's book is less political in a sense that he does not cast the movies he describes in the 9/11-War on Terror mega-movie/spectacle. To a large extent this comes with the format of the book as such which is first and foremost a filmography, in which movies are ordered alphabetically, and not chronologically or thematically. Also because of its informative, guide-like format, Cettl's description is not only more technical and detailed, it also focuses on various guises of terrorism (one of the movies he analyses is Attenborough's 1982 Gandhi, for example) rather than just Terror - against which the post-9/11 War has been fought. Last but not least, despite lesser focus on the historical/political context behind certain productions, so well analysed by the author of Firestorm, on many occasions Cettl lets the films talk for themselves, which ultimately allows the book's readers a more active and critical engagement with the material presented. This is only one of many reasons why the two books, both of which provide very interesting and thought-provoking accounts on terrorism-inspired cinema, complement each other, and as such, it is interesting and informative to read them together.

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Andrew Silke, *et al.*, (edited by Andrew Silke). *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism*. Routledge: Oxon UK, 2011. pp. 202. £21.98. ISBN: 978-0-415-55840-2. Reviewed by Robert W. Hand, University of Aberdeen

Edited publications frequently fall short in any number of ways; maintaining stylistic consistency, sub-subject complementarity and focus, sustaining a quality argument throughout the book, and more. These failures occur because all-too-often the editor compromises the holistic approach to produce a volume that is as true to the topic as it can be and as faithful as possible to the original submissions of the contributors, while approachable for the target audience. The resulting compromises often result in a publication that fails to reach its potential. This, however, is far from the case for Andrew Silke's, *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism*.

Silke's own writing is superb. His own chapter (Chapter 1) is a lucidly written, well-argued treatise on the duality of the impact of terrorism ("...not simply about physical suffering...about making a psychological impact,..." p.1.), the definition of counter-terrorism, counter-terrorism policies, and terrorist campaign elements. Silke goes on to artfully weave these into a critique of the various tactical counter-terrorism systems in use today by the US and UK governments. His chapter conclusion could not be more accurate: "Ultimately, psychology can provide powerful insights for anyone who seeks to better understand terrorism and counter-terrorism."

A broad and appropriate selection of subject matter experts author the remaining chapters. The themes of which are: Understanding terrorist psychology, recruitment, and terrorist group vulnerabilities (R. Borum, Univ. of South Florida); Psychoanalytic, Cognitive, and Social approaches to understanding radicalisation (B. Rogers, King's College); Psychological issues of supporting terrorism (R. Kumari, completing a doctorate in Counselling Psychology); The evolutionary logic of terrorism (R. O'Gorman, Univ. of Essex); The internet (L. Bowman-Grieve, Leeds (Trinity and All Saints)); The good *and* bad impacts of the media and a discussion on whether the media causes terrorism[1] (D. Browne, Univ. of London, and A. Silke); Disengaging from terrorism[2] (N. Ferguson, Hope Univ.); Managing terrorists and extremists in prison (A. Silke); Interrogating terrorist suspects, with significant practical examples and advice (J. Pearse, Managing Director, Forensic Navigation Services, Ltd.); Terrorist tactics and counter-terrorism (G. Steven, international security consultant); Deterring Terrorism (P. Fussey, Univ. Essex); and, Countering terrorism's psychological impact (A. Richards, Univ. East London).

What is unique about this edited publication is that it appears to avoid all of the pitfalls normally associated with a composite product, while (as the breadth of topics above indicate) it also covers the *complete* spectrum of terrorism and counter-terrorism psychology in sufficient detail to be understood and effective. This is even more impressive because the book does so without relying

on excessive technical references, diverging into evaluations based on different psychological theories, and the use of psycho-analytical jargon that would put its meaning and purpose beyond the reach of non-psychologists.

This publication is a superbly crafted volume of closely-interrelated chapters that cover the key concepts above and many more substantive issues as well. The critical ideas included, such as terrorist psychology, pathways leading to terror, technology's effect on terrorism, effective counter-terrorism measures, and more are essential to our understanding of this difficult subject. While it is largely grounded in psychological aspects of the counter-terrorism discipline, the book is so solidly and lucidly written that it should be included on *any* terrorism reading list for professionals and academics alike. *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism* is a new 'must have' standard for anyone serious in studying or countering the scourge of terrorism.

Notes

[1] This is one of the few works that acknowledges a negative effect (i.e., counter to terrorist goals) from media coverage, and makes a sustainable case for this viewpoint.

[2] This volume is also rare in that it discusses the issues surrounding the self-motivated disengagement of terrorists from their cause. One chapter specifically identifies the reasons terrorists leave 'the cause'. Such research must continue as part of an overall strategy to break the cycle of terrorism.

Leonard Weinberg. *Global Terrorism: A Beginner's Guide*. Oxford, UK, Oneworld Publications, 2005. Paperback US $14.95, pp. 182. ISBN: 1-85168-358-5, Reviewed by Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, United Kingdom.

Shocking the heart of US security policy, Al Qaeda's highly coordinated assault on the American homeland in 2001, radically redefined terrorism on a global scale and Western democracies' response to it. Our contemporary response to terrorism and terrorist acts represents a small part of Leonard Weinberg's faultlessly researched, well balanced, and authoritative book entitled: *Global Terrorism: A Beginner's Guide*.

Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Leonard Weinberg previously served as a consultant to the United Nations' Office of the Prevention of Terrorism, and authored several books and numerous articles on terrorism, counterinsurgency, and related topics. The breadth of his experience and expertise in the academic and professional fields is made apparent in this concise but critically important work.

Comprised of six chapters, *Global Terrorism*, considers a wide variety of circumstances in which this brand of violence has appeared across the turbulent spectrum of human history, and the "numerous and often competing political causes whose advocates had used it" (p. 1).The introductory chapter defines terrorism, addresses its multiple purposes and goals, and explores the policies and practice of state terrorism as well as terrorism and warfare. Accessing the roles of both terrorists and their respondents, Weinberg asserts that, "[f]or some the very idea of 'terrorism' is a snare and delusion, a way of diverting the public's attention from the failings of Western governments, the American and British ones especially" (p. 1).

Notable for synthesizing the many currents that fuel this less than value-neutral phenomenon, chapter two describes terrorism at its beginning, drawing particular attention on its religious and revolutionary motivations, and what Weinberg refers to as the "first," "second," and "third" waves of terrorism. In chapter three Weinberg delves into the operations and actions of Jihadi organizations and Al Qaeda. He refers to contemporary global terrorism as the "new terrorism," owing to the fact that, "Many of the bands and organizations that used terrorist violence in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s as a means of igniting social revolution have either passed from the scene or faded into the background" (p. 41).

Supplementing the new threat matrix now present within the realm of international terrorism, chapter four considers the specific features that give rise to terrorism, what types of people are drawn to terrorist movements and organizations, the push and pull factors for those who become terrorist, and the source of terrorist organizations. Weinberg is well aware that understanding the causes of terrorism is to understand the geographical locales in which terrorist attacks are carried

out, and the composition of societies at which they are directed. He adeptly illustrates that, "[t]he absence of democracy need not be a root cause of terrorism" (p. 67).

In chapter five, attention is turned to terrorism on the public, and the manner in which the mass-media shapes popular perceptions. Models of government response are presented, with an emphasis on understanding how "governments, and increasingly, transnational and international organizations have related to threats posed by terrorism" (p. 89).

The final chapter speculates on the future direction of 21st century terrorist strategies and campaigns. Not to be misled by the title: "The End of Terrorism," Weinberg argues that terrorism and terrorism violence as tactics "employed by disaffected groups of one kind or another seems unlikely to go away" (p. 116). Rather than conceiving of an endpoint to this international challenge, Weinberg considers ho this violent tactic will be used in the foreseeable future, by whom, and where. "How then do people stop being terrorists?" This question is posed amid a backdrop of concern of authorities' capacity to make them stop.

Since terrorism seems unlikely to disappear in the near and distant future, the prevalent view expressed in the final chapter of Weinberg's book is that terrorism is bound to morph in unpredictable ways. "At present most observers are especially concerned about terrorist adapting chemical, biological, radiological, and even full-scale nuclear weapons" (p. 131).

Global Terrorism: A Beginner's Guide is a sobering analysis that gathers a vast amount of historical information and combines it with powerful perspectives on the future of terrorism and asymmetric threats in an age of global uncertainty and perpetual security challenges. Weinberg crosses normative boundaries of analysis and discourse regarding the nature of terrorist activities and purposes of employing terrorist tactics in the course of government policy that has enabled its very survival. With the advent of "the new terrorism," As Weinberg's salient observations provide valuable insight into a critical field of studies for academic and policy-makers they are cogently exemplified in the 182 pages of this most useful book.

Paul Brooker. Modern Stateless Warfare. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, E-book $85.00, pp. vii + 256. ISBN: 9780230274761.Reviewed by Aleksandr Pikalov, University of St. Andrews

The phenomenon of insurgent warfare has plagued nearly every state in the world, from Colombia to the Philippines. Despite the plethora of books dedicated to the study of insurgency, Paul Brooker's 'Modern Stateless Warfare' brings together a new outlook on the emergence and persistence of insurgencies across the globe. Brooker's main thesis is that insurgent warfare and non-democratic governance have both simultaneously evolved to new forms due to technological progress and political change as well as in reaction to one another. He attempts to explain his thesis by dividing his book into two parts.

The first part, Insurgent Stateless Warfare, traces the modernisation of insurgent warfare and non-democratic rule in three distinct phases. Brooker argues that the first phase of modernisation, the nationalist phase, arose due to Napoleon's authoritarian rule over Europe, which incited a nationalistic revolt in Spain the first ever of its kind. The second phase, labelled the 'maoist' phase, was a response to the rise of totalitarian states during the 1920s-30s, which saw increased politicisation and militarisation of insurgent warfare to include the use of full-fledged regular armies in semi-state warfare. The third and current phase has seen the camouflaging of dictatorships as multiparty democracies and a greater reliance on technology to consolidate their control. This in turn has forced insurgents to use more clandestine approaches to pressure and harass their enemies. Brooker analyses the respective strategies embodied by each phase of insurgent warfare as well the semblances that terrorism and criminal enterprises have with modern insurgent bands.

The second part is dedicated to what Brooker calls the "Calculus of Insurgency." Based on Finer's "Calculus of Usurpation," Brooker's version is used to predict and explain the emergence and persistence of insurgencies past and present. The calculus is a combination of the motives, means, and opportunities available to insurgent groups. In addition this also includes factors that may preclude the insurgencies' materialisation such as moral inhibitions, political feasibility, and societal support. After going at length to describe in detail each aspect of the calculus, Brooker offers a final conclusion to the status of insurgent warfare in the future. Though he argues that insurgencies will continue to exist into the foreseeable future he also argues that, "it is always easier to predict the future path of technological developments than the future path of political developments" (Brooker, 2010, pp. 206). With this Brooker suggests that the fourth phase in the modernisation of stateless warfare will include the use of apocalyptic technology such as biological and nuclear weapons. Brooker notes that, "a group like Al Qaeda would have more difficulty acquiring a nuclear weapon than genetically altered biological weapons" (Brooker,

2010, pp. 208). Brooker concludes that any fourth phase threat, real or premature, would provoke a government response of enacting, what he calls 'Orwellian measures' in an attempt to neutralise the danger and consolidate its rule.

This book is a well-written and thoroughly researched work that skilfully illustrates the ever-changing nature of modern stateless warfare. This work stands out in comparison to the vast literature on the subject by its unique correlation between the evolution of non-democratic means of governance and the adaptation of violent opposition to those means. In contrast to many other books written on this subject this book is written in a simple and direct language, which makes it an approachable read for both students and scholars.

The book's shortcoming is that Brooker's conclusion on the future of stateless warfare is rather short for a work of its length. Though the conclusion connected his central thesis of stateless warfare and non-democratic governance modernising in response to changes in the political and technological sphere, it could have benefitted from a more detailed analysis. He briefly mentions the use of highly destructive weapons in revolutionary or secessionist insurgencies, yet ignores the illogic of their use established by the debate between Waltz and Sagan. Though he also briefly mentions the path that democracies may take he offers no solutions or insight into the counter measures that they may deploy against fourth phase insurgent warfare. Despite the brief conclusion the book overall was a enjoyable and informative read and I would recommend it to anyone interested in the field of terrorism studies.

Online Journal of Terrorism Research

In 2010 the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence launched the on-line Journal of Terrorism Research. The aim of this Journal is to provide a space for academics and counter-terrorism professionals to publish work focused on the study of terrorism. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the study of terrorism, high-quality submissions from all academic and professional backgrounds are encouraged. Students are also warmly encouraged to submit work for publication.

Authors who wish to have an article considered for publication should consult the submission guidelines or email gm39@st-andrews.ac.uk for further information.